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Résumé 
 
Des études précédentes ont montré que la déréglementation sur le marché des produits précède 
souvent les réformes sur le marché du travail (MT). Ce papier introduit les imperfections du marché du 
travail dans un cadre d’économie géographique, le niveau optimal de réglementation du MT 
dépendant des préférences sociales de chaque pays. En raison de la mobilité du capital, l’ouverture 
de l’économie avec un pays qui a un MT déréglementé met sous pression les institutions du MT. Avec 
la baisse des coûts liés au commerce qui accroît l’intensité des forces d’agglomération, la 
réglementation du MT perd en efficacité. La menace de délocalisations entraîne les changements de 
la politique du MT, ce qui suggère que l’effet de la libéralisation se trouve peut-être surtout dans 
l’affaiblissement de la protection de l ’emploi, avec peu de délocalisations effectives. 
 
 
Mots clés : Déréglementation, Négociations salariales, Mobilité du capital, Agglomération, 
Délocalisations 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Previous analyses showed that product market deregulation often precedes labor market (LM) 
reforms. This paper introduces LM imperfections within an economic geography framework, the level 
of optimal LM regulation being based on each country’s social preferences. Due to capital mobility, 
opening the economy to a country with a deregulated LM puts pressure on LM institutions. As the fall 
in trade costs increases the intensity of the agglomeration force, LM regulation loses in efficiency. The 
threat of relocation drives changes in LM policy, which suggests that the effect of liberalization might 
be found primarily in the weakening of employment protection, resulting in minimal actual relocations.  
 
 
Keywords:  Deregulation, Wage Bargaining, Capital Mobility, Agglomeration, Relocations 
 
JEL Classification: F12, F16, F20, J41, J42  
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1. Introduction 
To date, the question of product-labor market interactions has mostly been viewed through the impact 
of competition on employment and wages. Blanchard (2005) summarizes that the empirical evidence 
about the role of institutions is mixed and sees the exploration of other interactions as a promising 
avenue for research. Recently, from an empirical investigation which addresses multi-collinearity 
issues that might be responsible for the lack of robustness in previous results, Nicoletti and Scarpetta 
(2005) conclude that employment gains from product market deregulation are likely to be higher in 
countries that have rigid labor markets.  
 
Concurrently, recent works at the OECD highlight that product market (PM) and labor market (LM) 
deregulations are correlated across countries and that the former seems to precede the latter. This 
correlation is illustrated by Figure 1 taken from Brandt, Burniaux and Duval (2005): changes in PM 
regulation over 1993-1998 are significantly correlated with the intensity of LM reforms recorded over 
2000-2004. Said differently, “countries which have undertaken most labour market reforms recently 
are also those that had most deregulated their product markets beforehand” (Brandt et al., p.8). 
Moreover, IMF (2004) provides evidence that trade and financial market reforms have generally 
preceded domestic PM reforms. Even if an all encompassing liberal economic policy might seek to 
deregulate in both dimensions, which could explain this positive relationship, the sequence of events 
tells us more. The main purpose of this paper is to shed light on mechanisms which could account for 
this interaction, from increased competition in the PM to deregulation in the LM. 
 
Empirical literature has well established that foreign competition can have a negative impact on wages 
by reducing rents in concentrated sectors (e.g. Borjas and Ramey, 1995). However, lower rents does 
not mean that the rent-sharing scheme between capital and labor has changed. Rodrik (1997) was 
probably the first to formalize the idea that import competition might weaken workers’ bargaining 
power. The combination of capital mobility and cheaper trade can also weaken the bargaining position 
of workers through offshoring by limiting the availability of alternative jobs, a possibility which finds 
some support in Kramarz (2003) in the case of high-school graduates. Although most empirical 
analyses do point out that actual relocations affect a small number of workers, a recent poll in France 
indicates that thirty five percent of people surveyed consider that they, or someone closely related to 
 3 
them, face high risks of seeing their job delocalized. There is no doubt that high media coverage 
explains the extent of such fears, but this perception is factual and it is therefore easy to foresee how it 
could weaken the workers’ bargaining position.   
 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), hereafter BG, is the most influential paper dealing with product-labor 
market interactions. In an elegant setting combining monopolistic competition and wage bargaining, 
BG study the dynamic impacts of PM and LM deregulations separately. A short sub-section analyzes 
the regulation interactions per se and the intuition that PM deregulation leads to LM deregulation in 
their model is the following: because rents are reduced, unions no longer fight as hard. However, this 
line of thought should apply to shareholders as well. Based on a similar model, Spector (2004) 
suggests that PM and LM deregulations tend to reinforce each other.  
 
Going one step further, Ebell and Haefke (2006), endogenizing the bargaining regime, develop a 
theoretical model and show how intensified product market competition induces a shift from collective 
to individual bargaining. They suggest that the strong decline in coverage and unionization in the US 
and the UK might have been a direct consequence of PM reforms in the early ‘eighties. Their study is 
the closest to the main focus of the current paper which contributes to formalizing the idea of Gaston 
and Nelson (2004) that globalization is transformative, i.e. that its effects do not sum up in its direct 
impacts on wages and employment but extends to transforming the structures  of the labor market. On 
the empirical front, Bertrand (2004) shows that import competition and increased financial pressures 
alter the employment relationship in the USA from one governed by implicit contracts into one 
governed by the market. Dreher and Gaston (2005) find that globalization has contributed to 
deunionization in OECD countries, while Dumont, Rayp and Willemé (2006) and Boulhol, Dobbelaere 
and Maioli (2006) provide evidence that international trade has weakened workers’ bargaining power 
in Europe.  
 
The model proposed here brings four new contributions. It is a first attempt to introduce LM 
imperfections within an economic geography framework. Since the early ‘nineties, while geography 
models have been widely used to analyze European integration, the distinct features and 
heterogeneity of European LM regulations have been discarded in this literature. The current paper is 
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a first step to bridge this gap. We do this in the easiest and most tractable geography model, the 
footloose capital model (FCM) developed by Martin and Rogers (1995) and further analyzed in 
Baldwin et al. (2003). Secondly, we take into account one aspect of globalization that does not appear 
in the papers discussed above, capital mobility, and therefore study the interactions between capital 
mobility, tradability and LM regulation. Thirdly, the level of LM regulation is endogenized, depending 
on the country’s social preferences. Finally, new mechanisms through which opening the economy 
could put pressure on LM institutions are highlighted.  
 
The intuition of the model is as follows. As detailed in OECD (2004, Chapter 2), employment 
protection has as a main objective to improve working conditions and the well-being of workers. It is 
generally believed however that this comes at a cost for employers and generates insiders/outsiders 
conflicts of interest. Employment protection therefore most likely raises labor costs and 
unemployment. Modelling LM regulation using a bargaining model inspired from McDonald and Solow 
(1985) enables us to include these general features. Rent-sharing is mainly about distributing rents 
and, as a high level of workers’ bargaining power favors employed workers over capital owners, the 
institution in charge of LM regulation, referred to as “social partners” (SP) hereafter, might choose to 
regulate the LM based on the country’s social preferences. This link between social preferences and 
LM institutions fits in well with Freeman’s (2006) analysis, which stresses that the stylized differences 
between the two systems organizing the economy of the EU and the USA lie in the strength of 
collective bargaining and social dialogue versus market-driven worker-employer relationship 
respectively.  
 
As workers capture some share of the rents, capital return is negatively affected. With capital mobility, 
in addition to the capital flows inherent in the FCM and which depend on the relative factor 
endowments, opening the economy to a country that has a fully deregulated LM (because of its own 
preferences) entails capital outflows. As domestic rents are transferred abroad, the positive effect of 
LM regulation on average real wages is reduced or even reversed, all the more so that trade costs are 
high and importing the “delocalized” good is costly. When trade costs fall, the agglomeration force and 
the costs of regulation in terms of geographical attractiveness gain in intensity. When they are low, 
even the slightest regulation deters firms from producing domestically whatever the differences in 
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factor endowments and productivity levels between countries. LM institutions being endogenized, it is 
the threat of relocations which drives LM deregulation, neutralizing in turn the actual outflows of capital 
and relocations.  
 
Therefore, capital mobility induces SP to deregulate. Falling trade costs puts additional pressure on 
LM institutions (at least between countries of similar population and development levels) and, with full 
trade liberalization, even the most pro-worker SP will optimally choose a fully deregulated LM. In terms 
of SP utility, opening the economy is found to be, most generally, beneficial. However, unless trade 
costs reach a low enough level, it has a detrimental effect if SP have a strong pro-worker inclination. 
 
This way of formalizing LM regulation bears some resemblance to the tax competition models. One 
fundamental difference is that, in contrast to the tax competition literature, there is no pubic good to be 
financed by the tax receipts, which are the target of the tax competition. Here, the benefits of the 
regulation simply accrue to workers in the rent / unionized sector. Moreover, the link between 
regulation and social preferences highlights that the questions at stake are deeply rooted in the history 
of social relationships and collective choice. Another difference is that this “social competition” can 
arise between countries identical in terms of size and factor endowments. The remainder of the paper 
is organized as follows. Section 2 integrates LM imperfections into the FCM and Section 3 focuses on 
the open economy. Section 4 describes the role of social preferences in optimal LM regulation and 
shows how capital mobility and trade liberalization induce changes in LM regulation. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Model 
In this and the following sections, the level of labor market regulation is considered as given, whereas 
in Section 4, it is treated as endogenous and determined by social preferences. 
 
2.1. Footloose capital model with labor market regulation 
The setting of the model is the FCM. The two factors are labor and capital, denoted L and K. The utility 
function of each individual is a Cobb-Douglas CES nest of the consumption of two goods: 
aaaa aa ---- -= 1)1( ..)1.( AR CCV                                                                                                   (1) 
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One sector produces a homogenous good using only labor under constant returns and perfect 
competition and is commonly called sector A. The rent sector R produces the Dixit-Stiglitz good 
composed of a mass n of differentiated products under monopolistic competition.  
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One unit of capital is required to produce one variety i of the differentiated good. For each variety, 
labor is the only variable input and the unit labor cost is b  times the wage. In this setting, entry is 
constrained by the capital endowments and the number of varieties n equals K in autarky. Good A is 
the numeraire and the unit choice is such that one unit of labor produces one unit of the good: 
1;;/ === AAARR pLXLX b                                                                              (3) 
The only difference with the standard FCM lies in the decision by social partners to regulate the LM 
based on social preferences and the battle of wills. To reflect the idea that regulating the LM is 
essentially related to rent sharing, the level of employment protection is characterized by the 
bargaining power of workers, g , as in BG. Although within this framework, the benefits of regulation 
are limited to pecuniary advantages, we mean it to encompass the conditions which make workers 
happier in their job more generally. For the firm producing the variety i, workers and shareholders 
bargain over wages and employment simultaneously. The Nash bargaining leads to the maximization 
of the product of the parties’ surplus weighted by their bargaining strength, i.e. omitting the subscript i  
for variety: 
[ ] [ ] gg --- 1.).().( lwxxplzw                                                                                                       (4) 
where z is the reservation wage. First order conditions on wages and employment lead to: 
          zp ..bm= ; [ ] [ ] [ ]mngnmg ,11,0;..)1.(1 ÎÛÎº-+= zzw                                 (5) 
where )1/( -= ssm . Classically under efficient bargaining with a homothetic utility function, equation 
(5) states that the marginal revenue of labor is the reservation wage and clarifies that sector-R workers 
receive a share g  of the total rent )1( -m .  
 
The overall LM operates along the lines of McDonald and Solow (1985). Workers not employed in the 
rent sector could always occupy a lower paid job in the perfectly competitive sector and therefore, the 
reservation wage z  equals the wage in sector A which is unity. The alternative is to be unemployed,  
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total unemployment being denoted U. Indeed, being unemployed is supposed to give more time to 
search for a sector-R job and therefore a better chance to obtain one. This creates a positive 
relationship between the “sectoral unemployment rate” Ru  and the potential reward of obtaining a well 
paid job, i.e. the surplus enjoyed by manufacturing workers, 1)1.( -º- nmg . The reason is that, within 
this framework, a higher bargaining power raises the expected return from being unemployed relative 
to the return from working in sector A. The equilibrium unemployment rate is obtained when the 
expected utility of an unemployed person matches that of a sector A employed worker.  
1,0)1(,0',)(,)/( ===>=+º ARRR wzfffuLUUu n                              (6) 
 
In order to understand this mechanism through a simple example, consider the Harris-Todaro case 
where a sector-A worker gives up any opport unity to find a better paid job in the next period, whereas 
an unemployed person gets a probability q , negatively related to the “sectoral unemployment rate” 
Ru ,  to get a sector-R job: 0',)( <= quqq R . If d denotes the exogenous unemployment benefits, 
h  the exogenous probability to lose a high-paid job and r the discount rate, the steady state 
unemployment is given by Bellman’s equations which lead to the arbitrage condition: 
)(
)1).((
1).().(.
Ruq
drh
zrhqdrhwq
-+
=-Û++=++ n  , hence the positive relationship f . 
  
As in BG, unemployment arises from the bargaining scheme. Moreover, following McDonald and 
Solow, the transitional unemployment differs from the standard notion of search unemployment. 
Indeed, at each moment, the unemployed do not decide between accepting and rejecting offers; they 
take the first manufacturing job available to them. Because some sectors are perfectly competitive and 
others not, regulation de facto generates segmented labor markets. Therefore,  focusing on the 
function f  is a short cut capturing the essential component of the LM regulation trade-off, at least as it 
is generally perceived. Indeed as Saint-Paul (2004) summarizes, “a rough consensus emerged that 
high unemployment in Europe was due to labor market rigidities” which “increase the equilibrium rate 
of unemployment by boosting the incumbent employee’s bargaining power in wage setting”. The more 
regulated the LM, i.e. the higher the bargaining power g , the better off the rent-sector workers, the 
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higher the unemployment rate.1 Also, looking at the source of unemployment, i.e. the surplus )1.( -mg , 
highlights the complementary role of PM and LM regulation. Despite the focus here not being on 
domestic PM deregulation, it is clear that within this setting, the more the PM is regulated (high m , low 
s ),  the greater the impact of LM deregulation on the unemployment rate, and vice versa.  
 
2.2. Autarky 
In addition to the trade-off discussed above, the regulation has a negative impact on the return to 
capital, p , because part of the rents are transferred to workers. Indeed, for each sector-R  firm: 
RLnKlllwxp ).1).(1(..).1).(1().(.. gmppgmnmp --==Þ--=-=-=                            (7) 
Total GDP is given by ARAR LLXXpI +=+= .. m  and maximization of utility leads to: 
RAA LLIL ).1.(.).1( amaa -=Þ-=                                                                                (8) 
Because the relative price of the goods is not affected by the regulation, relative employment is not 
either, when capital is immobile. However in the open economy, efficient bargaining does not have a 
distributive effect only; it also has an allocative impact due to specialization. Denoting the country 
unemployment rate u, equation (8) and LM clearing give the sectoral employment levels: 
)1.(.)1.(,)1.(.)1.( uLLuLL AR --
-=-
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-=
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                                                              (9) 
The return on capital depends on the capital labor ratio LK /ºk and is obtained using equation (7): 
)1).(1.(
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= g
k
p                                                                        (10) 
where sa /ºb  is positively related to the share of the differentiated good sector in the economy and 
to the market power; b is a measure of the size of the rents in the economy. Importantly, as it will be 
the case throughout the paper, the FCM is obtained in the special case of the totally deregulated LM, 
i.e. with 0=g  and therefore 0=u . LM regulation reduces capital return both directly, by transferring 
part of the rents to workers and indirectly, through the unemployment rate, by reducing the labor 
endowment available to the economy. Finally, to close the model, we need to derive the 
unemployment rate: 
                                                 
1Even though this is the general perception, the empirical support of the link between various measures of  the strictness of 
Employment Protection Legislation and the unemployment rate had so far seriously lacked robustness (see Baker and al., 
2005). However, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) bring new evidence in support of this relationship.   
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This expression highlights that the country unemployment rate is the product of the “sectoral” 
unemployment rate and of the complement of the employment in sector A. This remains true with 
market opening and therefore, liberalization might wipe out unemployment as a result of specialization 
in sector A, should capital move abroad. However in autarky, the unemployment rate is positively 
related to the level of LM regulation unambiguously. Obviously, the lower the share of the rent / 
unionized sector in the economy, a , the lower the impact of regulation overall and the lower the 
country unemployment rate.  
 
3. Open economy 
There are two countries, an asterisk referring to the foreign country. International trade in good A is 
costless, whereas trade costs for good R are iceberg. t  denotes the trade costs for foreign products 
sold domestically and vice-versa for *t . Labor is immobile and capital perfectly mobile between 
countries. Moreover, capital owners are assumed to consume in their home country only. Therefore in 
the FCM, capital is better thought of as physical capital. The two countries may differ in the factor 
endowments and productivity, the level of labor productivity in the foreign country being *A  times that 
in the domestic country: 
****** .;/. AARR LAXLAX == b                                                                              (12) 
The effect of *A  simply amounts to a change in the foreign effective labor endowment which 
becomes **LA . The general case enables us to consider situations in which trade is driven by 
differences in productivity, relative endowments, size and trade policy. In addition, the countries can 
differ in their social preferences; in particular, the foreign country is assumed to have preferences so 
that its LM is totally deregulated, but sub-section 4.4 considers strategic LM policy. This is reminiscent 
of Davis (1998) who studies the “America versus Europe dichotomy” in a general equilibrium 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. While Davis analyzes the impact of minimum wages, we focus on another 
aspect of LM imperfections and include the advances of the new economic geography. Moreover, this 
setting can also be thought of in the context of European countries different in terms of size, 
development level and also LM regulation. 
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The movement of capital is fostered by two components. Firstly, in the absence of LM regulation, 
capital would flow according to the combination of the market access effect (agglomeration force) and 
the market crowding effect (dispersion force): in the FCM, the demand linkages are absent because 
income from capital is repatriated and therefore, agglomeration is not self-reinforcing. The resulting 
sign of these two forces in the standard FCM depends on the relative “size” of the countries, itself a 
function of the relative factor shares of capital and (effective, in the extension herein) labor, whereas 
the overall intensity depends on the level of trade costs.  Secondly, due to regulation, as shareholders 
have to forsake part of the rents in the domestic country, the return on capital is lower ceteris paribus 
than in the foreign country. With capital mobility, this obviously tends to trigger an outflow of capital 
abroad. At equilibrium, the share of firms located in the domestic country, ns  , equalizes capital 
returns by combining these two components. 
 
Two variables are essential for the characterization of the equilibrium: the location of firms represented 
by the share of firms producing in the domestic country, ns , and the unemployment rate, u , in the 
domestic country, and Appendix 1 gives all the details. Equilibrium in good R  leads to the expression 
of the capital return: 
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where )./( ** LALLsL +=   is the domestic effective labor share and )./()(
*** LALKKW ++=k  the 
world capital labor ratio. As in autarky, LM regulation in the domestic country reduces the world capital 
return through the two channels identified before. The impact of unemployment on the return of capital 
in the global market depends upon the domestic labor share, hence the Lsu.  term. As shown below, 
when the activity is fully agglomerated in the foreign country, equation (13) remains valid. In this 
situation, the source of unemployment, i.e. the presence of a rent sector, disappears from the home 
country and the capital return is equal to )1/(./1 bbW -k  which is the FCM return.   
 
We assume that the non-full-specialization condition (see Baldwin et al.), that is the condition which 
ensures that good A is produced in both countries, is respected. Here, this condition is 
)/()1( LL ssb --< s . Denoting the free-ness of trade, i.e. the so-called phi-ness, 
stf -º 1  and taking 
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equilibrium in sector A (or alternatively the balanced current account condition) into account lead to the 
first relationship between the share of firms and the unemployment rate in the home country: 
[ ] [ ]
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where LK sbsbs ).1(. -+º  , a weighting average of the factor shares, represents the relative “size” of 
the domestic country: in the standard FCM, s  is the share of domestic GNP. Finally, LM equilibrium in 
the domestic country gives the second relationship: 
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Equation (15) is easily interpreted. In the open economy, unemployment is driven by two channels. 
The first is the “sectoral unemployment” which directly leads to the autarky unemployment rate and to 
the first term on the RHS. The second channel is the number of sector-R firms producing domestically, 
which leads to the second term. Therefore, full employment is reached either because the LM is 
deregulated ( 10 =Û= ng ) which eliminates the primary cause or because the R-economy is 
aggregated in the foreign country ( 0=ns ). We can therefore expect the open economy unemployment 
rate to be hump shaped, as a function of the workers’ bargaining power. This is a result of the 
conflicting effects of the increase in the “sectoral” unemployment rate and of capital outflow, which 
triggers the decrease in the share of sector R in domestic production. The outcome, that 
unemployment tends to disappear when relocations expand, could at first seem strange. However, this 
follows very logically from two assumptions. First, the adjustment of labor in the path towards the open 
economy is neglected, as the equilibrium described here corresponds to the long run equilibrium. 
Second, it is a direct consequence of the LM model based on the trade-off between regulation and 
unemployment. Concretely, it implies that the unemployment which disappears with the shrinking of 
the rent / unionized sector is the part of total unemployment resulting specifically from the insider / 
outsider conflict. Given the levels of the trade costs and bargaining power, equations (14) and (15) 
define the location of firms and the equilibrium unemployment rate, leading to Proposition 1A. 
 
Proposition 1A. Location of firms and unemployment rate in the open economy 
(i) Unilateral trade costs. Given the level of the bargaining power and of the foreign trade 
cost, if domestic trade costs are low enough, then all R-firms are agglomerated in the 
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foreign country. Formally, the unilateral (U)  “sustain point” (S) for the agglomeration in the 
foreign (F) country, FUS
,f ,  is given by:       
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(ii)        Bilateral trade costs: *ff = . Given the level of the bargaining power, if trade costs are low 
enough, then all R-firms are agglomerated in the foreign country. Formally, the bilateral 
(B)  “sustain point” (S) for the agglomeration in the foreign (F) country, FBS
,f is such that:  
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(iii)     Unemployment. The domestic unemployment rate is hump-shaped in g . At the foreign 
agglomerated equilibrium, the domestic country is, by definition, fully specialized in good 
A and the unemployment rate is zero:   0=Þ³ uFSff  
 
The proof follows directly from equations (14) and (15) and is given in Appendix 1. From (15) we infer 
that, at the level of trade costs where the firms are agglomerated in the foreign country, the 
unemployment rate is zero. Based on the numerator of (14), it follows necessarily that this level is 
defined by ),( *ffg g=  which characterizes  the sustain point. Naturally, this sustain point is an 
increasing function of the size of the domestic country: the larger the domestic country the lower the 
domestic trade costs necessary to make the agglomeration in the foreign country sustainable. It is 
interesting to consider the case where the relative capital share Ks is equal to the relative effective 
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labor share Ls  and therefore to the “size” s . This situation is very natural since the steady state in a 
typical growth model is such that capital is proportional to effective labor. Between countries of 
comparable population levels, ignoring the effect of LM regulation, relocations tend to take place from 
the poor to the rich country. This is because the differences in labor costs reflect the differences in 
productivity and therefore, the level of development becomes the main determinant of the size of the 
market and of the location of firms. Of course, in the general case where countries have different 
population levels the two components of effective labor, productivity ( A ) and population ( L ), matter. 
 
The fact that the share of domestic firms is an increasing function of *f  is due to the better 
attractiveness of being located in the domestic country when it is cheap to serve the foreign market. 
The opposite applies for the relation with f . In the bilateral case ( *ff = ), these two effects oppose 
each other and the relative size of the countries becomes crucial.  
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From equation (16), it is straightforward to derive the scissors diagram (Figure 2), which illustrates how 
the location of firms depends on the size, s  , when f  and g  are given. 
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Compared to the FCM, there is an extra term, the last one on the RHS, which depends on the level of 
LM regulation. This term shifts the diagram to the right. As in the FCM, the larger country tends to 
appropriate more capital and the home market effect increases with the phi-ness of trade. Importantly, 
the additional negative effect due to regulation dominates when trade costs are low: 
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Indeed, an inspection of the power in the denominators makes it clear that when trade costs are low, 
the LM regulation effect dominates whatever the size of the domestic country that respects the non-full 
specialization condition. This is because when the goods market becomes more integrated, the 
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location of firms is less relevant and therefore, only the negative impact of regulation on capital return 
matters for firm’s location decision: 0lim,00)(~lim
11
=¹"Þ=
®®
nsg
ff
gf . 
 
Appendix 1 shows that the unemployment rate is given by: 
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The unemployment rate is exactly zero when the LM is fully deregulated or when the phi-ness of trade 
exceeds the sustain point. Based on equation (15), the sensitivity of the unemployment rate to trade 
costs has the same sign as that of the share of domestic firms. Figure 3a illustrates this pattern for 
different levels of trade costs in the symmetric country case )2/1( === sss LK . When trade costs fall, 
as more firms locate abroad (equation 17 with )2/1=s , the domestic country specializes in good A,  
and the unemployment rate decreases. Figures 3b and 3c illustrate how the domestic share of firms 
and the world capital return react to the workers’ bargaining power for various levels of trade costs. 
The difference in capital returns between the two countries drives the location of firms and the 
equilibrium location is the one which equalizes these returns. When this is not possible (domestic 
bargaining power too high, i.e. yg ³ ), the agglomeration in the foreign country is the only equilibrium. 
Moreover, in autarky the greater the bargaining power, the lower the domestic return on capital. It 
therefore requires more firms to move to make the returns converge. In addition, as trade costs fall it is 
easier to serve the domestic market from abroad, which renders the location in the foreign country 
even more appealing. As it is clear from Figure 3c, with market opening, nominal capital return, i.e.  
capital return relative to sector-A wages, increases in the domestic country. Thus, at constant 
bargaining power, as inter-sector relative wages are constant, market opening benefits capital owners 
relative to wage earners in the regulating country.  
 
Up to now, the model has been analyzed by assuming a given bargaining power and assessing the 
impact of varying trade costs. However, it is clear that all the results can be interpreted by holding the 
phi-ness of trade constant and studying the impact of varying the regulation level. In particular, this 
enables an easier characterization of the agglomerated equilibrium in the domestic country, which has  
been left aside. In this spirit and as a transition to the following section, Proposition 1A can be 
interpreted from the point of view of the “social partners” who choose the level of LM regulation. 
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Proposition 1B. Minimum and maximum levels of labor market regulation 
         (i)     Agglomeration in the foreign country. Given the level of trade costs, there exists a 
maximum level of the workers’ bargaining power beyond which all firms move abroad:  
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                   This maximum level of the bargaining power is a decreasing (increasing) function of the 
domestic (foreign) phi-ness. In the bilateral case, it is decreasing with the phi-ness. 
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(ii) Agglomeration in the domestic country. Given the level of trade costs, if the domestic 
country is large enough, there exists a minimum level of the workers’ bargaining power 
under which all firms operate in the domestic country.  
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This minimum level of the bargaining power is a decreasing (increasing) function of the 
domestic (foreign) phi-ness. In the bilateral case, it is hump shaped in the phi-ness. 
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Figure 4 illustrates the preceding results. For each chart, Proposition 1A can be read horizontally for a 
given bargaining power, whereas Proposition 1B is read vertically for a given level of trade cost. The 
bilateral case is explained as follows. When trade costs are prohibitive no agglomeration is possible. 
When the goods market is fully integrated, the least level of regulation triggers the agglomeration in 
the foreign country. At intermediate levels, the agglomeration rents are the strongest (see Baldwin et 
al., Chapter 15) and, if large enough, the domestic country can attract capital and support some level 
of regulation. The hump-shape of ming when the domestic country is large enough is related to the 
well-identified hump-shape of the agglomeration rents in the tax competition models. However, no 
 16 
matter how large, if the regulation level exceeds a certain threshold, then all firms go abroad. We are 
now in a position to study the impact of market liberalization on LM regulation. 
 
4. Endogenous labor market regulation 
4.1. Autarky  
In our model, the regulation of the LM clearly has a negative impact on real GDP. Indeed, the price 
index in autarky, assaa bm )..(/ )1/(1)1/( -- == KKpG , does not change with the level of regulation and 
given equation (9), real GDP is: 
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The higher the unemployment rate, the lower the GDP. Consequently, a utilitarian government would 
choose to totally deregulate the LM. However, we consider the case where the social partners (SP) 
have an objective different from the maximization of the GDP depending on the extent of their pro-
labor (vs pro-capital) orientation, represented by parameter l . Specifically, it is assumed that they 
may put less weight on capital income, the greater the parameter l .  
[ ]1,0,.).1(.. Î-++= lpll G
KLwLw
OBJ RRAA                                           (21) 
When 0=l , SP are indifferent to the distribution of revenue and the objective function boils down to 
the real GDP. In the other extreme when 1=l , SP only cares about labor income. As argued by 
Saint-Paul, LM regulation is mainly about distributing rents and we focus here on this distinct aspect of 
regulation. Furthermore, Saint-Paul demonstrates that this type of regulation is inefficient in the sense 
that a government with the same objective would primarily choose to redistribute through taxation and 
hence avoid the detrimental effect of unemployment. However, there are different reasons why it is 
interesting to analyze the consequences of LM regulation. Firstly, SP are mostly thought of as a mixed 
representation of union and employer organizations. Tax instruments are beyond their reach. 
Secondly, Saint-Paul shows how such a regulation might emerge as a result of the strength of various 
lobbies or even of the coalition between insiders and capital owners to the expense of outsiders. 
Thirdly, we intend to keep away from issues related to capital taxation per se.  
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Although the orientation of the SP, l , or social preferences could come from a political process, we 
consider that it is idiosyncratic to a particular country and determined by such deep causes as the 
history of social relations, the battle of wills between various lobbies, the political orientation or the 
structure of shareholding – for instance, a country where the culture of stockholding is deeply rooted or 
where pension funds play an important role is likely to have a low l . For all these reasons, trying to 
model the social preferences parameter explicitly based on such country’s characteristics as factor 
endowments is likely to prove both overly ambitious and unsatisfactory: countries may differ in their 
social preferences which shape different institutions. What explains  the differences in so-called social 
models, between the USA and continental Europe, between the various LM institutions in the E.U.?   
 
Appendix 2 shows that in autarky: 
[ ])1.(.1).1.( gll ---= bucteOBJ                                                                                          (22) 
Equation (22) makes it clear that regulation has two effects on SP utility: a negative one through 
unemployment which reduces GDP and a positive redistributive effect, the term between brackets. 
This term is all the greater for a given bargaining power, when the size of the rents is higher ( b ) and 
when the SP are the more pro-labor ( l ). Differentiating (22) leads to:  
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When the expression on the RHS is positive, SP utility increases until the bargaining power hits the 
value of the RHS term, from which it then decreases: this value is therefore the optimal regulation level 
from the point of view of SP. Two points are worth noting. When the pro-labor orientation l  is small 
enough, the RHS of the inequality is negative and the SP opt for deregulation. Secondly, the higher 
the sensitivity of the unemployment rate to the regulation, gddu / , the lower the RHS, and therefore 
the lower the optimal level of the bargaining power.  
 
In order to move further, we have to specify a functional form f  respecting (6) and to remain as 
general as possible, we choose f depending on a parameter d  which measures how sensitive the 
unemployment rate is to the regulation level. Appendix 2 gives the full derivation, the exact function 
being chosen to facilitate the calculations:  
 gsdndg ).1/()1.()( -=-»= fuR                                                                                  (24a) 
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This function fits the Harris-Todaro case sketched out in sub-section 2.1 almost perfectly with 
drh
h
-+
=
1
1.d .2 As one might expect in that case, d  is an increasing function of the probability to 
loose a job, h , and of the unemployment benefits, d . Given this functional form, the autarky 
unemployment rate is: 
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increasing with b , d  and g  unambiguously. Proposition 2 indicates the optimal regulation level.  
 
Proposition 2. Optimal labor market regulation in autarky 
The optimal level of regulation )(ˆ lg  is an increasing function of the social preferences parameter l :  
(i) If d is greater than 1 , then SP will choose a totally deregulated market whatever their 
preferences:      llgd "=Þ³ 0)(ˆ1  
(ii) If d is lower than 1, then any country with pro-labor orientation lower than minl  (given 
below) chooses to deregulate totally, whereas SP with a stronger pro-labor inclination 
decides to regulate according to 0)(ˆ >lg . In particular, if d  is lower than )1( b- , any 
government such that maxll ³  (given below) chooses to transfer all the rents to 
workers. Formally,  
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 (Proof is directly derived from equation 23 and is given in Appendix 2)  
 
The optimal LM regulation level is positively related to the pro-labor inclination, l , and negatively 
related to the sensitivity of unemployment, d  . The first part of the proposition states that if the 
unemployment rate is too responsive to regulation ( 1³d ), then even the SP most inclined to favor 
workers will choose to fully deregulate. However, if this is not the case, the redistributive effect 
                                                 
2 Details are available upon requests. 
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dominates when the social preferences are such that minll ³ . The SP then decide to regulate all the 
more, the greater the parameter l . To give an intuition of a relevant order of magnitude for d , 
consider the maximum “sectoral” unemployment rate achieved when all rents go to workers,  
)1/()1(max -»== sdgRR uu . Note that the case 1³d  looks fairly extreme for reasonable values of 
s since it means that )1/(1max -³ sRu .
3 Let us now turn to the open economy. 
 
4.2. Pressure to deregulate the labor market in the open economy 
Based on their respective preferences, the domestic country is assumed to have a regulated LM in 
autarky in contrast to the foreign country.4 Proposition 1B states that if the regulation in the domestic 
country is too favourable to workers all firms move abroad. When trade costs are prohibitive, there 
always remain some firms in the domestic country (except in the limit case where all rents go to 
workers). However, when trade costs fall, this bargaining power ceiling diminishes towards zero. With 
free trade, all firms move to the foreign country, except if the domestic LM is completely deregulated,  
in which case the FCM equilibrium is reached. In addition, regulating the LM beyond maxg  has no 
additional effect on the economy as the rent sector has disappeared. 
 
However, is it that damaging if all firms move to the foreign country? After all, within this framework, 
capital owners spend domestically. The answer depends on what the reference point is. If the 
comparison is with autarky, the answer is: it depends on how costly importing good R  is. If the 
question is between alternative choices of LM policy in the open economy, then total relocation hurts 
unambiguously. Indeed, let us compute the general price index. Since LM regulation does not affect 
relative prices, the price index is standard and negatively related to the share of domestic firms:  
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3 The range for the empirical estimates of s  is quite large. Based on price-cost margins analyzes, they should not be far from a 
[5 , 8] range. However, these analyses almost always assume perfect LM. Because what is measured is in fact the share of the 
rents kept by firms, taking into account workers’ bargaining power leads to a lower range. For instance with 3.0=g , the range 
above becomes [3.8 , 5.9] - for example, 3.8 = 1 + (1-0.3).(5-1) -  implying maxRu  between 20% and 36% for 1=d . 
4 This means that 1<d  and lll << min*  .  
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In other words, except if trade is costless, an increase in LM regulation entails an increase in the price 
index due to firm relocations abroad (because 0/ <¶¶ gns and 0/ <¶¶ n
open sG ). Very importantly, 
when comparing the equilibrium corresponding to the fully deregulated LM ( 0=g , FCM) with the 
agglomerated outcome in the foreign country ( maxgg ³ ), one notices that wages are identical, equal to 
1, unemployment is zero in both cases and nominal capital returns are equal (see equation 13). 
However, because the price index is lower in the first case, welfare and the utility of the SP are both 
greater. What is remarkable about this result is that it holds whatever the social preferences:   
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In fact, the full deregulated equilibrium is Pareto superior to the agglomerated one in the foreign 
country. Equation (26) implies directly that the optimal level of regulation is lower than ),( *max ffg g= . 
As this maximum bargaining power tends to zero when trades becomes costless, the optimal choice is 
to fully deregulate in that case, whatever the social preferences. This is the main result. 
 
Proposition 3. Optimal level of labor market regulation in the open economy 
(i) Whatever the social preferences parameter, the optimal level of regulation is lower than 
the level leading to the aggregated equilibrium abroad:    lglg "£ max)(ˆ  
(ii) As trade becomes costless, the optimal choice is to fully deregulate:   0)(ˆlim
1
=
-®
lg
f
 
 
In autarky, the advantage of protection is to increase average wages. With market opening, as local 
firms are deterred to produce domestically, the redistributive component of LM protection is ineffectual 
above a threshold. Compared to the deregulated LM situation, it just makes imported goods more 
expensive. This threshold, in a way the maximum tolerated level, diminishes with trade liberalization. 
Stated differently, even the slightest protection is non optimal from the point of view of SP when trade 
becomes very cheap. Indeed, firstly capital mobility puts pressure on LM institutions because of the 
threat of outflow and secondly, trade liberalization reinforces the attractiveness of being located 
abroad, so that any positive effect of regulation on SP utility is wiped out when trade is costless. 
However, as the LM is deregulated, firms are no longer inclined to relocate their activities. The threat 
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of relocation drives the changes in LM institutions. In this stylized framework, the effect of liberalization 
is to be found in the weakening of employment protection, with minimal actual outflows and 
relocations.  
 
All simulations indicate that the optimal level of LM regulation is a decreasing function of the phi-ness 
of trade when the domestic country is not too large. However, establishing this relation analytically is 
probably not possible. Proposition 3 is therefore a weaker result but one strong enough for the main 
purpose of the paper. If the domestic country is very large / rich then the relationship between the 
optimal regulation level and the trade costs can be non monotonic and depends on the social 
preferences parameter as illustrated in Figure 5 with symmetric trade costs. Figure 5a presents the 
case of the symmetric country where the optimal regulation level decreases in the phi-ness. When SP 
are utilitarian ( 0=l ) or even when l  is sufficiently small then the LM is deregulated whatever the 
level of trade costs. Figure 5b presents the case of a large / rich country ( 9.0=s ) in which the SP 
choose optimally to regulate the LM, at least when l  is large enough and trade costs reach an 
intermediate level. Two features are striking. Firstly, in any case the optimal regulation level is lower in 
the open economy than in autarky. Secondly, the optimal level is flat at zero when l  is low. It is 
hump-shaped when l  is intermediate / low and negatively sloped when SP have a high l . This 
pattern is due to two conflicting effects. The first is due to the hump shape of the agglomeration rents 
which enables the SP to regulate if their social preferences tend to be pro-worker. The second results 
from the fact that high- l  SP opt for a very high degree of LM regulation when the product market is 
sufficiently closed (low f ). This second effect means that in such a country, a gradual opening can 
only trigger a loosening of regulation from such a high level. The combination of these two effects 
gives the contrasted patterns depending on the social preferences parameter. For instance, when l  is 
intermediate ( 5.0=l in Figure 5b), the shape is a combination of that obtained when l  is 
intermediate / low ( 3.0=l ) and when l  is high ( 8.0=l ). 
  
4.3. Impact of market opening on social partners’ utility  
Given the pressure to deregulate with market opening, it is natural to compare the autarky and the fully 
deregulated trade equilibrium. Domestic capital owners unambiguously win in nominal terms with each 
step of the following sequence (recall Figure 3c): capital mobility, falling trade costs, full LM 
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deregulation. In real terms, this effect is reinforced because trade leads to a fall in prices, at least 
when Ks³f  (see equation 25), and in any case with symmetric countries ( Þ== 2/1Kss  
2/1)0( ==gns ): this is one of the sources of the usual gains from trade. This price effect also means 
that, in the sufficiently open economy, sector-A workers are better off with LM deregulation. Next, 
autarky unemployed workers find jobs and see their real income increase too. Finally, for sector-R 
wage earners however, the outcome is not clear-cut. Limiting ourselves to *ff =  leads to: 
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Real wages improve with market opening and deregulation, only if the initial protection, and therefore 
the underlying level of the pro-labor orientation, is below a certain level. This implies that when the LM 
is highly regulated to start with, the combination of liberalization and optimal LM deregulation might  
generate conflicts of interests and uncover levels of resistance among workers in the rent sector:  
deregulating is detrimental to them, especially when trade costs are high.5 Appendix 3 shows that 
when trade costs and the pro-labor inclination are high enough then the gains from trade are too low 
to compensate for the loss of the redistributive tool and SP utility decreases with total LM deregulation.  
 
Does the opening of the economy improve SP utility when the SP choose the optimal LM regulation? 
Simulations indicate that the general pattern is that opening the economy is beneficial when SP 
adapts the regulation level optimally. However, when SP have strong pro-labor preferences and 
therefore highly regulate the LM in autarky, market opening is detrimental to them unless trade costs 
are low enough.  
 
To sum up, these results highlight how the different liberalizations interact. With capital liberalization, 
barriers to trade could be harmful, especially if the LM is highly regulated, and therefore, capital 
mobility renders trade liberalization critical. In turn, falling trade costs reinforces agglomeration and 
triggers LM deregulation as employment protection becomes ineffective. 
                                                 
5 Unless the country is very labor intensive ( Kss /  large) in which case opening to the world capital market has a strong 
beneficial price effect as shown by (25). 
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4.4. Strategic labor market policy 
We finally contemplate the case where the foreign country might also regulate its LM.  
 
Proposition 4. Strategic labor market regulation 
(i) The maximum level of domestic LM regulation is an increasing function of the LM regulation 
level in the foreign country, a decreasing (increasing) function of the domestic (foreign) phi-ness.         
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The straightforward implication is that when trade is fully liberalized, regulation cannot be stricter than 
in the foreign country and SP strategically choose a level below to attract firms. Therefore, integration 
with non-cooperation between SP triggers a race to deregulate, whereas cooperation could lead to a 
different outcome. This suggests that in order to promote their interests, unions should join forces with 
their foreign counterparts. If not, liberalization induces them to loosen LM regulation sharply. 
 
5. Conclusion   
This paper is a fi rst attempt at introducing labor market (LM) imperfections in an economic geography 
setting. The most obvious limitations refer to the specificities of the model integrating wage bargaining 
in the footloose capital model. Although we have kept away from capital taxation issues per se, as  
bargaining is directly associated with rent -sharing, this framework presents some similarities with 
capital taxation used as a redistributive purpose. It is, however, consistent with segmented LMs, which 
arise because the size of the rents differs across sectors.  
 
However, this framework captures some interesting features, even when the analysis is limited to the 
case of two countries, differing only in their social preferences, opening to each other. The levels of 
LM regulation are chosen based on their idiosyncratic social preferences. In autarky, LM protection 
has the advantage of shifting part of the rents to workers and therefore, of increasing real wages. This 
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comes though at the cost of unemployment and lower capital return. Weighing-up these components, 
the social partners choose the optimal level of protection. 
 
In the context of perfect capital mobility with a country that has a totally deregulated LM (because of its 
own preferences), the pro-real wage effect of regulation is at best attenuated. Indeed, as firms seeking 
higher capital return move abroad, total rents diminish and the share kept by workers as well. Within 
this setting, if the domestic country has a regulated LM initially, market opening will unambiguously 
benefit capital owners relative to wage earners. In addition, shipping the “delocalised” good has an 
adverse effect on the purchasing power of domestic consumers. Consequently, the benefits of LM 
regulation are significantly reduced, or even reversed, by the mobility of capital which leads the 
government to deregulate.  
 
When trade costs fall the intensity of the agglomeration force increases further. The level of protection 
beyond which all firms move abroad decreases as trade in goods becomes cheaper. When trade 
liberalization extends, even the slightest LM protection deters any single firm to produce domestically. 
The only outcome of LM regulation is then to make the imported goods more expensive compared to 
the fully deregulated LM equilibrium. As trade tends to become costless, the optimal choice is to totally 
deregulate the LM. This result is also striking because it holds even if the social partners have a strong 
pro-worker inclination.  The threat of relocation, which becomes more credible when trade costs are 
low, drives the changes in LM institutions. Consequently, the effect of liberalization might be found 
primarily in the weakening of employment protection, with minimal actual outflows and relocations.  
 
Obviously, deregulation can generate conflicts of interests. Capital mobility combined with high trade 
costs makes the wage earners who enjoyed some share of the rents in autarky worse off. If SP have a 
strong pro-worker preference which is reflected by a high level of regulation in autarky, this situation 
generates a decrease in SP utility. It is only if the gains from trade, typical of the monopolistic 
competition, are large enough, i.e. trade costs low enough, that the negative impact of deregulation on 
real wages is offset. The current model underlines the complexity of analyzing the effects of 
globalization taken as a single phenomenon, even if focusing on only two aspects, capital and trade 
liberalization. 
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Generally, in terms of economic policy, support for market opening is drawn from models assuming a 
perfect LM. Taking into account LM regulation, this study highlights how capital and trade liberalization 
can put pressure on LM institutions. Therefore, liberalization measures should be thought of as tied to 
the LM deregulation they trigger. This combination might be well accepted by countries with initial low 
protection. However, countries that attached importance to LM protection may face a difficult situation 
once engaged in the liberalization process, especially if trade barriers are not so benign. Conversely 
according to this model, a government, which is prone to liberalize on all fronts, could start with capital, 
which makes trade protection very costly, then follows with trade openness which eases the burden of 
high import prices and finally let the SP, potentially undergoing this new environment, opt for LM 
deregulation and support further trade liberalization in their own interests.            
 
 
Appendix 1: The Open Economy 
A domestic firm produces yxX .*t+= , where x  and y  are sold in the domestic and foreign country 
respectively. Similarly, for a foreign firm,  *.** yxX t+= . As in autarky, capital returns are: 
 X.).1).(1( bgmp --=     ,    *.).1(* Xbmp -=                                                                             (A1) 
Therefore, the assumption of perfect capital mobility leads to the equalization of returns, as long as 
both countries produce good R: 
XX ).1(* g-=                                                                                                                            (A2) 
The specific effect of potentially different productivity levels between the two countries is reflected in 
the wages in the foreign country as prices are linked due to trade in good A : 1* == AA pp  ; 
** Aw =  ; 
pp == bm.* . Equation (A2) highlights that because some rents are transferred to workers in the 
domestic country, domestic firms should be bigger than their foreign competitors in order to cover fixed 
costs and be able to pay the same return to shareholders. I  denoting nominal GNP, worldwide 
equilibrium in good R is:  
 **,*).*..(.*).( KKnnXnXnII +=++=+ bma                                                                     (A3) 
***.**,.. LAKILLKI AR +=++= pnp                                                                        (A4) 
Given the equalized returns condition (A 2), equation (A3) becomes, 
[ ] [ ]*.*.*).(..)1.(*.. LALLKKXnn AR ++++=-+ npagbm                                                            (A5) 
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The production function of good R links sectoral output and employment: 
b..XnLR =                                                                                                                                (A6) 
Using equation (A1), (A6) and )1.( uLLL AR -=+ , equation (A5) becomes: 
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From (A1), the equilibrium capital return is then easily obtained: 
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Classically with iceberg trade costs, bmttt .... *** === ppp xy  and bmttt ..*..
** === ppp xy , and 
therefore, Dixit-Stiglitz preferences imply:  st -= .* xy  and  st -= *.*xy . The equilibrium for good R in 
the domestic and foreign country is respectively: 
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Combining equations (A9a) and (A9b) to get yxX .*t+=  and reciprocally for *.** yxX t+=  gives: 
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It is already clear that, when f  tends to 1 , the system (A10a)-(A10b) implies that the bargaining 
power cannot be strictly positive even if 1* =f . Eliminating I  from the system (A10a)- (A10b) leads to: 
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Substituting successively the expressions of the capital return and of a domestic firm’s output given by 
(A1) and (A 7) leads to the first relationship linking the location of firms to the unemployment rate: 
          
[ ]
)1.(
***..).1).(1(*)..1(
.
.
**
fg
bgmff
bm
a
f
--
+---
=+
X
LAKX
nn  
          
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
-
+-
-+-
--
-
=--Þ
L
nL
Kn
su
ss
bsbs
.1
).1.(
)1().1.(.
1
*.1
*).1(1
*
* ggg
fg
ff
f                                            (A11) 
 27 
It is convenient to denote LK sbsbs ).1(. -+= . The weighting of factor shares in s  highlights that when 
the share of spending in good R and/or the degree of market power is high, i.e. b  is large, then the 
spatial distribution of capital owners matters the most. Conversely, when b  is small, labor distribution 
across countries is crucial. After some manipulations, equation (A11) leads to (14) in the main text: 
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In order to reach the second relationship, i.e. equation (15), we need to calculate the sectoral 
employment. This is achieved easily by combining (A6) and (A7):  
      [ ] Þ
+-
+--
-
=
n
n
R s
s
LAuL
b
b
L
.1
.**)1.().1.(
1 gg
s    )(.
)1.(
1.1 nf
L
LuL
u
L
L
u RR
A
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ --
-=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-=    
n
n
A
A
n
n
L s
s
u
u
s
s
f
f
b
b
us
u
.1
.
)(1
)(
.1
.
)(1
)().1.(
1/1 ggg
g
ggn
ns
+--
=
+--
-
-
=
-
Þ                                        (A13)                             
 
Agglomeration in the foreign country (Proof of Proposition 1A and 1B (i)) 
When the activity is agglomerated in the foreign country, 0=ns  and given (A13) the unemployment 
rate is zero due to specialization in sector A. The sustain-point is the parameter where the numerator 
of (A12) is equal to zero. Substituting the expression of ns  given by (A12) into (A13) leads to the full 
expression of the unemployment rate in the open economy: 
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where [ ][ ] AAK uusb ).1.().1().1(.)1).(.1.(.. **** gfgfgggfffgV ---+-+--+=  is a second order term: 
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Furthermore this approximation is exact in the two following cases: the unemployment rate is zero 
either when the LM is totally deregulated ( 00 =Þ= Aug ) or when the agglomerated equilibrium is 
reached ( Þ³Û³ ygff FS  0=ns  and 0=u ). Combining (A13) and (A14) leads to: 
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It is therefore obvious that 0/ <¶¶ gns . Simple differentiation shows that: 
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In order to complete the proof, we differentiate (A14):    
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When the bargaining power is small, Au  is small, the first term between brackets dominates and the 
unemployment rate is an increasing function of g . Conversely, when the bargaining power is close to 
the sustain-point ( yg ® ), the second term dominates and the unemployment rate decreases with g . 
 
Agglomeration in the domestic country (Proof of Proposition 1B (ii)) 
When the activity is agglomerated in the domestic country, 1=ns  and (A13) entails L
A suu /= : 
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that ming  is hump-shaped in f  and reaches a maximum when 
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Stategic labor market policy (Proposition 4) 
Introducing LM regulation in the foreign country simply modifies (A2) into XX ).1(**)1( gg -=-  and 
repeating the steps from (A3-A13) leads ultimately to [ ]****
*
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--=  . 
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Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2 
Using equation (9) leads to the expression of nominal GDP, I , and SP utility: 
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hence (22). Differentiating this expression with respect to the bargaining power leads to:  
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d being a constant representing the sensitivity of the unemployment rate to the regulation level, we 
choose the following functional form:  )1.(.
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Therefore, whatever the level of parameter )1(£l , if d  is greater than 1 , 0)1,1(),1(),( =<£ jdjdlj .  
This means that, in this case, SP utility is strictly decreasing with the bargaining power and therefore, 
the SP choose to fully deregulate, which proves (i) of Proposition 2. When d  is lower than 1 , it is easy 
to verify that 1
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0),( <dlj and 0)(ˆ =lg , hence (ii) a). Moreover, as 1),)1/(( =- ddj b , if social preferences are such 
that )1/(max b-º³ dll  then all rents are transferred to workers and 1)(ˆ =lg . In the intermediate case 
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Appendix 3: Comparison between autarky and fully deregulated open economy  
Based on (A15), SP utility in autarky is [ ] [ ]LbubGOBJ AAAAA .)ˆ1.(.1).1.()1.()ˆ( 1 glgl ----= -   and:                          
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(which proves Proposition 3 more explicitly). It follows that: 
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Using the specific form f detailed in Appendix 2 and following Proposition 2, if b-£ 1d  and 
)1/(max b-=³ dll  then the optimal bargaining power equals 1  in autarky. Therefore, based on the 
autarky unemployment rate given by (24b): 
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If SP are such that )
~
,(max max lll >  then the last term on the RHS is greater than 1  and, for low 
enough phi-ness, total deregulation is detrimental in terms of SP utility compared to autarky (the same 
remark as in footnote 7 applies). 
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Figure 1 
Changes in product market regulation over 1993-1998  
and intensity of labour market reforms over 2000-2004 
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Correlation coefficient: 0.51 
t-statistics                    2.58** 
 
 
Source: Figure 34 in Brandt et al. (2005) 
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Figure 2: Scissors Diagram 
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Note. 
The simulation for ns   is based on the specific function )1.()( -= ndnf  (see section 4). However, the impact of the 
parameter d  is insignificant such that the expression given by equation (16)   )./()( ygcgy --»ns cannot be 
distinguished from the true value. The curve labelled “approximated ns ”  comes from one further approximation: 
cgy /)( -»ns and proves to be  close to the true value. With )./()( ygcgy --»ns , equation (17) becomes : 
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which demonstrates that the slope is steeper than the one resulting from the approximation.  
 34 
Figure 3 
Symmetric Countries in terms of Size and Trade Costs: *,2/1 tt ==s  
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Fig. 3b: Share of Domestic Firms in Sector R 
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Fig. 3c: Capital Return (foreign autarky return = 1) 
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Figure 4 
Agglomeration and Sustain Points 
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Sustain point  ( maxg ) for the agglomeration in the foreign 
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Sustain points ( ming ,  maxg ) with symmetric trade costs 
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Figure 5a 
Optimal Level of Labor Market Regulation as a Function of Trade Costs 
Symmetric countries and trade costs ( 5.0=s , *ff = ) 
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Figure 5b 
Optimal Level of Labor Market Regulation as a Function of Trade Costs 
Large / Rich country ( 9.0=s , *ff = )  
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